Turkish-Israeli relations in the post cold war era by Kardas, Tuncay
i fei е т  ITS I TP π  P B / v i  sti о  м  ir* ii %■< т% qtAr*» s a i  ■ © ж  »îr^cA* i*· iSí i·? 2л* Чгі? i  а«л\ ; іГ 4·^  » V» 1ä fcüiií? 'i»ß ^  L w  S •'í^ :
· ;ч; ··! ^ '"  T*, · -  : «wf 7  ^_.■.  ^ »>*·· ^ ¿ 4 ;  ■·■; ■ %'■ ?; ·
■;^ ^  -i--* '·*^' ■·' ’^*^'·*’ - Ä
:Vía. .^.-ft. Ѵл,^ , ΐ  ,^· ‘ ^  "!;ϊ 5"'
/ / 5 S
.Г І ?
Л - З Т -
/ 5 ^ 4 !
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN THE 
POST COLD WAR ERA
BY
TUNCAY KARDA§
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELA TIONS
SEPTEMBER 1999 
ANKARA
кл і  
К η
і 7 і ) 4 9 3 3 1
Approved by the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences.
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.
Assist. Prof. Gülgün Tuna
1 certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.
(Thesis Supervisor:) Assist. Prof. Mustafa Kibaro^lu
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations
X  , .  r .
Assist. Prof. David Pervin
ABSTRACT
The end of the cold war resulted in the emergence of the new threats and the sources of 
instability in the Middle Eastern region. Turkey and Israel, in this context, needed to 
reassess theii' security envii'onment, in which, they, relatively enjoyed the “cold war 
stability” until December 1991, the collapse of the bipolar system. This need, beginning 
from the mid-1990s transformed itself to a new strategic partnership between the two 
countries that was built on the bases of commonly perceived threats, military and 
economic cooperations. This master thesis strives to explain this strategic partnership 
with its grounds. The effect of this new partnership upon the regional states is also 
examined. It is also concluded that the strategic partnership is bound to have certain 
ramifications such as changes in the strategic calculations of the regional states and 
counter alignments.
ÖZET
Soğuk savaşın bitmesi Ortadoğu bölgesi için yeni tehditlerin ve istikrarsızlık kaynağı 
yeni gelişmelerin ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Türkiye ve İsrail soğuk savaş dönemi 
boyunca faydalandıkları görece güvenlik ortamını yeniden değerlendirme ihtiyacı 
duymuşlardır. Bu ihtiyaç, 1990’larm ortalarından itibaren ortak tehdit algılamaları, askeri 
ve ekonomik işbirliği temelleri üzerine kurulan bir stratejik ortaklık haline dönüşmüştür 
Bu yüksek lisans tezinde, yeni ortaklığın ortaya çıkışı, nedenleri ile birlikte araştırılmıştır 
Bu yeni ortaklığın bölge ülkeleri üzerindeki etkileri de incelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca 
bu ortaklığın bölge devletlerinin stratejik durumlarında değişiklikler ve karşı ortaklıklar 
gibi kaçınılmaz sonuçları olacağı belirtilmiştir.
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INTRODUCTION
After the collapse of the bipolar system in 1991 and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 
1993, the predictions about a possible “new order” were so bold as to mean that the 
international system took a huge deflection and affected many regions including the 
Middle East; the world would face a new Middle East which could serve as a center 
for “political reconciliation” and social, cultural and economic benefits for all the 
parties. However, the worst fears were realized; for more than tluee years the peace- 
process was stalled, the tension between Lebanon and Israel continues, the power 
vacuum in Northern Iraq stiU waits to be llUed. Also there exists increasing resentment 
among the Arab world against the US stemming from its inability to force Israeli 
government to obey the Oslo Accords and the United Nations (UN) resolutions on the 
Palestinian territories while successfully maintaining its “relentless” blockade on Iraq.‘ 
The spread of weapons of mass destruction is high on the agenda. Arab intransigence 
toward Israel still reigns supreme. New rogue regimes come to the surface in countries 
such as Sudan and Afghanistan. The logic of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” 
prevails,^ it also leads to new-group forming in the Middle East that carries the 
potential to override the powerful factors in the social scene such as ideology or 
religion (it causes no surprise to see Chidstian Greek “Democrats” allying themselves 
within Muslim “despotic” Syrians.)
The military cooperation between Turkey and Israel began to take shape after the 
Israeli agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in September
‘ See Martin Indyk, “Symposium on Dual Containment,” Middle East Policy, Vol.3, N o.l, (January 
1994), pp. 1-27 and Alon Ben-Meir, “The Dual Containment Strategy is no Longer Viable,” Middle 
East Policy. Vol.4, No.3, (March 1996), pp. 58-72.
 ^ Interview with the retired ambassador Şükrü Elekdag, 15 February 1999, Ankara.
1993. Facilitating factors such as both nations being non-Arab, democratic, secular, 
western-oriented with a sense of alienation from “others”, all helped them to maintain 
sustainable relations for decades.^ Additionally, they both have special relations with 
the US and have tried to hold out by the huge military powers. For each, terrorism 
poses a great thureat and both put their relations with Syria and Iran before others.
In addition to the agreements of 1993 when Turkey signed the declaration for strategic 
cooperation with Israel and 1994 when then Prime Ministers: Tansu Çiller of Turkey 
and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel articulated the vision for enhanced cooperation between 
the two countries; specifically, in February 1996, Israel and Turkey have concluded a 
historic mihtary training agreement which was followed by an “Ai'ms Industry 
Cooperation Pact” in August 1996. These have paved the way for increasing economic 
and military ties that enabled both sides to fly and train in one another’s aii'space, share 
sophisticated intelligence, information, cooperate on joint security and weapons 
projects and enjoy extensive trade relations.
The end of the cold war was another important factor that has led Turkey to ally itself 
with Israel. After the “Soviet threat” ceased to weigh heavily against Turkey, the 
inihtary and bureaucratic eûtes due to the feai" of being marginahzed, began to employ 
new foreign policy initiatives with regard to the perilous state of the Middle Eastern 
region.“* Also Turkey has always been mindful of the strong support of Israel in the 
US, pai’ticulai'ly tluough the pro-Israeli lobbies which are essential inner-political 
actors of the US that can strengthen Turkey’s lobbying presence in Washington.
See Alan Makovsky, “Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish periphery-strategy”?, in Reluctant 
Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, edited by Henri J. Barkey, Washington D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace, 1996, pp. 147-70.
Alain Greish, “Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and Their Impact on the Middle East, “Middle East 
Journal. Vol.62. No.3 (Spring 1998), p.l91.
From the Israeli point of view, it is obvious that, Israel, facing the isolation in the 
Middle East, following the rise of the Netanyahu government to the power in 1996, 
was in an urgent need of support from a non-Arab Muslim power in the region, 
although the newly elected Prime Minister Ehud Baraq launched a new initiative in the 
peace-process with the Arab world. The support Israeh government needed was 
provided by a state, namely Turkey, which is a westernized, secular and democratic 
country maintaining a free-market economy. This support makes Israeli supremacy 
possible against Iraq, Iran and S50'ia. Israel also welcomes a potential 65 million 
Turkish customer market. The coming revenue from arms sales, the opportunity to 
conduct exercises for its air force and the joint mihtary exercises would be essential for 
Israel to establish a strategic power in the Middle East,^ retain its overwhelming 
mUitary superiority, its security arrangements and a “peace founded on strength.”  ^
Furthermore, Israel strives for a new foreign policy initiative in the Central Asian 
republics, which would provide a “sphere of influence” in the region by creating an 
“economic hinterland.”^
The rapprochement is likely to have widespread ramifications in the region including 
the possibility of counter-power blocs.
Therefore, with this in mind, the thesis aims at presenting an understanding of and 
depicting the process of developing strategic partnership between Israel and Turkey 
after the cold war. *
 ^The Turkish Daily News. (7 September 1998).
* See Benjamin Netenyahu’s Speech at the National Defense College, 14 August 1997 (http://www. 
Israel-mfa.gov.il).
’ See Bülent Aras, “Post Cold War Realities; Israel’s strategy in Azerbaijan and Central Asia (The 
Caspian Region),” Middle East Policy. Vol.5, No.4, (January 1998), pp. 68-82.
The thesis comprises 4 chapters. Following the introduction, the first chapter starts 
with the post-cold war developments in the Turkish-US, Turkish-European and 
Turkish Middle East relations as the foundation for the strategic partnership, between 
Turkey and Israel.
The second chapter lays the emphasis on the historical background of the relations that 
Turkey had with the Middle Eastern states and the Israeli State, prior to the end of the 
cold war.
The third chapter strives to base some important Turkish and Israeli motives for the 
rapprochement.
The fourth chapter brings the 1990’s improving relations into focus. It also provides a 
chronology of the important aspects of the developing relations.
CHAPTER I
POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS
1.1. Introductory Remarks
The 1990s witnessed lots of factors of instability: In the Middle East the cessation oi 
the Soviet threat and the end of the Gulf war have altered the patterns of security 
considerations; at least for Turkey. After becoming a “front-line” state in North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey is now uneasy about its location. 
Namely, the ethnic diversity and the conflicts in general and some potential problems 
such as; terrorism, immigration, the locked peace process and militai'y imbalances are 
all posing threats to Turkey’s security.
1.2. Turkish-US Relations after the Cold War
As a “model” for the Middle-Eastern countries in the eyes of the US, in addition to its 
NATO membership, Turkey played an important role in the strategic calculations of 
the US after the cold war era.
By and large, Turkey and the US had more or less a unified vision in the perception ■, 
the threats in the region, whereas their approach towards the issues diiTeientla' v i
Particularly after 1991, Turkey began to act together with the US on a case by case 
basis rather than in a unified mode.
Generally speaking, Turkey is in need of the US support when bearing in mind the fact 
that it is surrounded by a region with great instability; ranging from Greece to Syria; 
each of which has certain profound problems with the Turkish republic. Owing a lot to 
the different understanding of the rudiments of the “Kurdish Question”, the UN 
embargo against Iraq and lastly the Clinton administration’s economic embargo against 
Iran; Turkey strived to initiate its own policy formulations.
Specifically, Turkey, in regard to the so-called “Kurdish Question” wanted to employ 
its own methods towards Northern Iraq as to lessen the negative impacts stemrning 
largely from the internationalization of the question. In that respect it had taken the 
initiative to have meetings with Iran and Iraq, discussing the existing status of 
Northern Iraq, starting from 1992.® After that, in August 1994, the Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs declared that it would control its borders to check the flow of people 
to Northern Iraq. Additionally, Turkey had signed an economic agreement with Iran 
including a 23-year natural gas agreement in August 1996.
These were the signs of the desire of Turkey to place some limitations an American 
plans and projects over the region.
' Foreign Broadcast Information Service.Western Europe (FBIS-WEIJI (16 November 1992).
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Turkey deemed the above measures necessary; however, it was aware of something 
that it could not go on so far due to the fact that it is stiU in the interest of the country 
not to be at odds with the US. Particularly, the US military industry was a key factor 
in its fight against the “Kurdish Workers’ Party” (PKK). Since it was hardly possible 
to change the whole standards of its weapons, it had felt the cruciahty of the US 
technology very keenly.
In August 1994, the US president Clinton signed a “foreign aid bill” which was passed 
by the US Congress, for the 1995 fiscal year, containing a special provision suspending 
10 percent of the $ 453 milhon from the US military aid to Turkey, because of the 
“unsatisfaction with Turkey’s progress on the human rights issue and Cyprus 
Question.”  ^ What’s more, the US also issued a cutback in its weapons and equipment 
program which was essential for the fight against the PKK. Although the Turkish 
government of that time rejected this “conditional portion” of the aid; it did not carry 
this attitude too far. This sort of confrontations between Turkey and the US (and 
Europe) went on occasionally where Europe and US have criticized the Turkish 
military’s “undemocratic methods” used against the Kurds.
It became apparent that as Turkey set its own course in its foreign policy in the region, 
it was highly likely that the tension would grow between Turkey and the US.
Turkey’s importance in the post cold war era is that it is geographically well located to 
have some influence over the Balkans, the “newly independent states” (the NIS) and 
the Middle East. The Turkish state model, which is characterized by its secular
’ FBIS-WEU. (29 August 1994). 
FBIS-WEU, (29 August 1994).
structure, free-market economy and the parliamentarian democracy was perceived by 
the US as an essential example for the development of democratic and secular Muslim 
states in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Middle East. It was also seen as a balancing 
actor against Russian power by limiting its effects upon the NIS countries.
Considering the Balkans, the US administration expected Turkey to serve as a buffer 
against a Serbian push Southward into Macedonia and encouraged developing ties to 
Albania as well. ‘'
Turkey’s answer feU short of the US expectations in the Caucasus, Central Asia and 
the Balkans as in the Middle East: to make it more specific; Turkey, rather, wanted 
Iraq not to be a playground, also, it realized that it is beyond its capacity to go along 
with the requirements of the US administration. In effect, Turkey opposed a divided 
and/or destroyed Iraq due to the possibility that this could lead to a balance of power 
shift in favor of Iran and a possible Kurdish state that would weaken the territorial 
integrity. In particular, when the “Kurdish Democratic Party” (the KDP) and the 
“Patriotic Union of Kurdistan” (the PUK) met in Washington, compromising the 
contractual issues and progressing in the political and military issues which they had 
decided to start in July 1994 in Paris, as a counter act to this, Turkey tightened its 
borders with Northern Iraq and decided to take some measures against the economic 
and political isolation of Iraq. This, in turn, prompted an uneasiness in Washington 
and as a last minute effort. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnott was in
Obrad Kesic, US-Turkish Relations at a Crossroads, “Mediterranean Ouarterlv. No. 1. CWinter 
1995), p.99.
The Washington Post. (1 October 1994).
'Ibid.
Ankara to reflect Washington’s displeasure of Turkey’s position/'^ The US Congress 
echoed its dissatisfaction as well.
1.3. Turkey and the Europe in the New Era
The Cold War era shaped Turkish foreign policy in three directions 1) Turkey’s place 
in the bipolar balance system, 2) Turkey’s position in the Middle Eastern subsystem, 3) 
Relations with Greece.'^ In the post-Cold War era, Turkey in an attempt to secure its 
position in the Western world for which the Soviet threat ceased to exist; strived for 
gaining the status of membership in the European Union (the EU). In this new era, 
with the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe taking the first lines in the queue 
to become members of the EU, Turkey realized that it ought to find out new foreign 
policy tools that could validate its existence as a security partner of the West. In so 
doing, it turned towards the East with the Gulf war.‘^
However, as the Gulf war ended, the domestic problems began to come to the surface 
with the help of the new foreign policy objectives. The new pohcy formulations carried 
the potential to serve Just in the opposite way because Turkey was a country that 
embedded with internal conflictual aspect. As a result, its stabilizing, regional actor 
character becomes ineffective.
‘‘‘ The US News. (3 October 1994).
All Karaosmanoğlu, ‘Turkey’s Security and the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs. 62, N o.l, (Fall 
1983), p. 157.
Meltem Müftüler, ‘Turkey: A New Player in the Middle East,” Mediterranean Quarterly. No.4, 
(Fall 1995), p.111.
Some linked Turkey’s domestic problems directly to its stabilizing country character: 
‘The persistence of a violent domestic conflict wiU undermine Turkey’s role as a 
stabilizing country in the regions in which its interests and those of its Western allies
coincide.' ,17
Besides, Turkey’s military interventions, which began with “operation steel” on 25 
March 1995, into Northern Iraq that aimed at rooting out the PKK camps and 
preventing them from infiltrations; hindered the relations between Turkey and the 
European states: The European Parliament rejected to ratify the Customs Union 
agreement of the EU which was to be ratified in September 1995. In addition, 
Germany, Norway and Holland abandoned to sell arms as a reaction to the 
intervention. Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
declared that Turkey had two months to withdraw from Northern Iraq, and to pass 
reforms on the “Kurdish problem” or its membership would be suspended.
1.4. Turkey and The Middle East after the Cold War
When answering the question why Turkey has begun taking rather an “active interest” 
in Middle Eastern politics in the post-Cold War era (which contrasting with its 
relatively low profile role during the Cold War) the role it envisioned itself and the 
state of the region should not be omitted. *
Henry Barkey, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma,” Survival (35), No.4, (1993), p.66.
** Müftüler, p .ll9 .
10
Turkey’s relations with the region in the 1990s can hardly be exempted from the 
political and social uncertainties it faced, in addition to the altering nature of the 
domestic context of the foreign policy making process and the new issues coming to 
the center, hence, becoming integral parts of the foreign policy. It appears that, 
Turkey, after a period of disengagement, is becoming a more active player in the 
region. The examples of the new situation cannot be confined to the developments in 
Northern Iraq and to Ankara’s more “active” policy over Damascus that aims to curb
its support to the PKK. 19
Another aspect of Turkey’s involvement came into the scene with the Islamist party, 
namely, “Refah” that got the control of governmental power with the help of a 
coalition with the center-right “True Path” party in June 1996. There was no doubt 
that the Refah experience would have important implications for the relations with the
Middle East. 20
The end of the Cold War also had a profound effect on Turkey in such a way that it 
sparked off a discussion as to what would happen to its role in the Western alliance.”* 
The first sign of a more active policy in the region was the Gulf war experience in 
1990-1991. By its support to the allied coalition, Turkey’s act, represented a radical 
departure from the established policy of noninvolvement in regional conflicts and
wars. 22
See Philip Robins, The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue,” International 
Affairs. No.4, (October 1993), pp. 657-676.
Ohristian Science Monitor. 13 June 1996.
See Sabri Sayan, ‘The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis,” Middle 
East Journal. N o.l, (Winter 1992), pp. 9-22.
The New York Times. (22 January 1991).
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The aim was to expand its influence and political role in the region, to gain leverage 
regarding bilateral defense and trade issues, and to be a full member in the EU and to 
increase its trade and business opportunities in the Middle East.'^
Considering the result of this strategy one can conclude that they are not promising; 
regarding Turkey’s export to the Middle East, there was no significant rise, also, the 
UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq cost Turkey dear and it went on to lose 
above $20 bilhon between 1990 and 1994 due to the cut of the pipeline that passed 
through Turkish soils."'* According to Demirel, the Turkish president, Turkey received 
just about $3 to $4 billion worth of compensation from “our friends in the Gulf.”"'^
With regard to the new regional role in the early 1990s; the occurrences of the 
expectations of Turkey were at poor rates, particularly with respect to tangible 
political and economic gains. Another consequence of Turkey’s new involvement in 
the Middle Eastern affairs was that it raised concerns in the Arab World about the 
possibility of a Turkish dominance in the region."*’
1.4.1. The “Kurdish Issue”
The Kurdish Problem was complicated with the failure of the allied coalition to oust 
the Saddam regime and with the unsuccessful Kurdish rebellions that resulted in the 
inflow of tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees in March and April 1991 into Turkey.
Sabri Sayan, “Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990’s” Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 26, 
No.3, (Spring 1997), p.47.
Milliyet. (17 January 1995).
The Washington Post. (5 June 1994).
Sayan, p.47.
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Ankara’s decision to agree to host an alliance force “Operation Provide Comfort” (the 
OPC) including Turkey itself, at Incirlik airbase, Adana, which was formed to protect 
Iraqi Kurds above the 36'*’ parallel from attacks by the Iraqi military forces, was a 
decision whose main thrust was to prevent frirther waves of Kurdish refugees. 
Surprisingly, to many (while conspicuously to some) this humanitarian act was 
producing an “unexpected” outcome: a new “Kurdish political entity” under the 
protection of the Western powers beyond Iraqi control.
Turkey, without doubt, seeing it as an opening gambit, opposes an independent 
“Kurdish state” which will be near its borders..This is due to the potential that such an 
entity may have an effect as inciting the ethnic Kurdish national sentiments within 
Turkey. Despite the above argument, Turkey reluctantly accepted this newly emerging 
entity that was dependent on the OPC.^’ The terrorist organization PKK was not late 
to take advantage of the absence of authority in Northern Iraq, especially to establish 
bases close to the Turkish borders. Apart from the internationalization of the problem 
and strengthening of the position of the PKK, the post-Cold War developments 
underscored the ethnic consciousness among Turkey’s Kurdish citizens, particularly 
those living in the country’s southeastern region.“*
After the PKK’s chaUenge to Turkey’s political order and territorial integrity became 
the foremost security issue on both domestic and foreign policy agendas, the Turkish 
mUitary forces’ response to this challenge came intensely. Although Turkey was secure 
in the knowledge that most of its own Kurdish population by no means wanted to
”  FBIS-WEU. (12 November 1992).
See Graham E. Fuller ‘Turkey in the New International Security Environment” Foreign Policy. 
Vol.16, No.’s 3-4, (1992), pp. 29-44.
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separate itself from the mainland, the cost of suppressing the PKK’s violent activities 
was very high, not only in terms of fatalities which were more than 30.000, but it also 
caused a rise in the large scale social and economic uneasiness in southeastern Turkey, 
because economic sources were diverted to combating the PKK. In short, the situation 
in the Northern Iraq has intensified Turkey’s own “Kurdish problem.”
At the international level, Turkey had to sort it out from other sources of conflicts 
with its neighbors, namely, Iraq and Syria. In regai'd to Iraq, Turkey strived to 
normalize its relations with Saddam’s government hoping to help the preservation of 
the unity of Iraq and to the reestablishment of stability along the borders."^ Turkey 
also endeavored to remove the UN economic sanctions on Iraq through the diplomatic 
channels.C onsidering the “hot-pursuit” agreement between Baghdad and Ankara 
signed in 1984, Turkey faced with no legal limitation in regai’d to its incursions into 
the Northern Iraq during the 1980s .Af te r  the Gulf war Turkey subsisted the policy 
of incursions to put the PKK on the defensive and to hinder it from using the border 
area as a refuge for its militants. For instance Ankara sent 40,000 troops across the 
Iraqi border for a six-week military operation to terminate the PKK bases and its 
logistical infrastructure in March 1995. Also in 1996 Turkish officials declared that 
they intended to establish a “security zone” inside Iraq along the border which 
attracted heavy criticism from Baghdad and other Arab countries. It was also not 
welcomed by the West. All of these reactions led Turkey to refrain from the 
implementation of the plan.^^
The Washington Post. (24 September 1996).
Ibid.
Sayan, p. 47. 
Ibid.
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Regarding Turkey’s reaction to Syria, whose support to the PKK was known very 
well, it was with the help of the media and politicians when it began to denounce Syria 
and force the government to take more effective and forceful measures to curb its 
support to the Kurdish rebels.”
Although Ankara held that Syria was the principal source of external logistical support 
and training for the PKK it did not generally carried this criticism too far hitherto the 
escalation of the PKK activities in the 1990s. Turkey was even aware of Syrian 
involvement in its domestic political problems since the mid 1970s.”  In fact, Turkey 
and Syria had signed a “security protocol” to coordinate their actions against all 
terrorist groups, including the PKK.”  What’s more, Turkish, Syrian and Iranian 
foreign ministers got together in Damascus in August 1994 to discuss the regional 
problems, particularly the security implications of the Kurdish issue.
However, Syrians rude attitudes in turn, made Turkish governments increasingly feel 
apprehensive and mistrustful of their policies. Syiia, in the meantime, has increased its 
criticism of Turkey’s use of water from the Euphrates river and tried to mobilize of her 
Arab States against Turkey. Syria and Iraq are standing against Turkey’s plan to divert 
water from the Euphi'ates for its massive irrigation project, called the Great Anatolian 
Project (GAP). Syrian and Iraqi governments oppose the project on the ground that it 
would reduce their share of water. Turkey rejects their claims including the one called
Yeni Yüzyıl. (13 January 1997).
See Şükrü Elekdağ, “Two and a Half War Strategy, “Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs,
N o.l, (March-May 1996), pp.33-57.
Newspot (Ankara). (2 December 1993). 
”  Hürriyet. (24 August 1994).
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“acquired rights.” Ankara claims that the allocation should be based on technical and 
scientific criteria that try to achieve a maximum equitable utilization of water resources 
in the region.^’ Although there existed an unwillingness to admit a linkage between 
Syrian support for Kurdish separatism and the water issue, many officials are, now, 
publicly denouncing the Syrian side that it is using the PKK to get concessions from 
Ankara over the supply of water to downstream countries.
Syrian efforts to rally support from the Arab states bore fruits in the form of an issue 
which came after the January 1996 meeting in Damascus of the foreign ministers of 
seven Arab countries criticizing Turkey and caUing for a permanent water-sharing 
agreement to replace the provisional accord under which Ankara accepts to allow the 
flow of 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria Thus, it is no coincidence that 
the worsening of the relations with Syria overlapped with the new military training and 
education agreement that Turkey signed with Israel in February 1996.
Turkey’s official reactions were finely tuned to the tug of war between Arab states and 
Turkey. They endeavored to do so by playing down the strategic implications of the 
agreement and by emphasizing that it is not directed or intended against any third party 
and also not a formal alliance between Israel and Turkey.^® Turkey, also, underlined 
the point that it is similar to the mihtary agreement and education agreements that 
Turkey had with other countries.
Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, Fırat-Dicle Havzasında Su Sorununa Kapsamlı Bir Bakış. Manisa Celal Bavar 
Üniversitesi Yüksek ÖSrenim Vakfı Yavını. (1) Manisa, 1997, p.7 (footnote).
Hürriyet. 2 January 1996
Christian Science Monitor, (29 August 1996)
“^ Ibid.
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Neighboring countries’ reactions were severe. Arab countries and Iran criticized it 
with varying degrees of reactions. The Egyptian reaction, amongst them, was the 
weakest, they officially asked for an explanation about its nature and purpose.'"
A soUd warning came from a two-day summit in June 1996 in Damascus where the 
leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria issued a joint statement expressing their 
concern and demanding for a reconsideration of the agreement by Turkey. A similar 
can was issued at the Arab summit meeting in Cairo later that month where Syria 
failed to gain an outright condemnation against Turkey due to the strong opposition
from Jordan. 42
1.4.2. Turkey and the Peace-Process
Turkey supports the peace process on the ground that it will increase regional 
economic cooperation, base a new ground for the opportunities for trade an 
investment and be an important step toward regional stability. Turkey, in short, has 
been a supporter of the Middle East peace process since the historic breakthrough in
Israeh-Palestinian relations. 43
Additionally, Turkey also reckons on the outcome of the peace process such that it 
will release Turkey from the task of offsetting between its commitment to having 
diplomatic and political ties with Israel against its efforts to be in close terms with the
With Egypt, Turkey has had relatively “good” relations during the last decade.
Turkish Probe. (28 June 1996).
See Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Turkey in Search of Security in the Middle East” Perceptions. No. 1; (March- 
May 1996), pp. 151-168.
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Islamic world, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which, by and large, is tied to concrete
economic and security interests in the region. 44
Turkey, which although sometimes failed to meet these two goals and took criticism 
from the Arab world; tried to participate in the multilateral working groups related to 
the peace process in the issues of water, economic development and arms control
issues.45
Turkey also supported the new Palestinian government, being one of the first countries 
to do so, in November 1988.'*  ^ After December 1991, Turkey upgraded its relations 
with the PLO that was followed by visits, increasing economic and political ties 
offering them to help with their housing and other infra structure projects. Palestinian 
authority, in turn, helped tune down the criticism to Turkey. Yaser Arafat, for 
instance, has opposed strong Arab criticism of Turkey about the Israeh-Turkish
agreement. 47
There is one aspect of the peace process that concerns Turkey: its possible 
ramifications on Syria’s military and strategic posture. To be more specific, Turkish 
officials fear that when an agreement is signed up between Syria and Israel, then Syria 
will relatively be in a better position militarily vis-a-vis Turkey and hence pushing 
Turkey for answering its claims about the water issue and Hatay province.
M.H. Yavuz ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Quality and the 
Development (1950-1991)”, Arab Studies Quarterly. Vol.74, No.4, (Fall 1992), p.73.
45 Ibid.
M. Bali Baykan, ‘The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950’s to the 
1990’s, “International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies”. N o.l, (February 1993), pp.91-110.
Sayan, p.49.
18
Damascus can also be expected to pursue its objectives much more actively which 
could lead strong tensions in Turkish-Syrian relations. Turkey also fears 
uncomfortable about the US position in that regard. The US is seen as not being fully 
supportive of Turkey’s criticism of Syria’s ties with the PKK, since the importance of 
Syria in the peace process is clear to the US.“*
1.4.3. Domestic Constraints of Turkey’s Middle East Policy
The most visible aspect in that respect is the role that the pohtical Islam can play. The 
Refah experience (June 1996- June 1997) highlights the increasing domestic strength 
of pohtical Islam. After Refah Party came to power, the challenge to the country’s 
secular form of government and the “identity crisis’’ were once more on the agenda.“^  
The ruling ehte, showing sohdarity with the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
founder of the modern Turkey, has endeavored to instiU a sense of Westernization into 
the country rather than identifying itself with the Islamic world and the Middle East. 
Atatürk also emphasized this pro-western identity while employing his strategy of 
modernization and social charge. Despite this, Islamists thought that Turkey should 
identify itself as a part of the Islamic community, and seclude from western political 
military and economic organizations.
Regarding the public reaction to the above argument, some public opinion poUs 
underline a division among the Turks on the issue, for instance according to the
See Suat Parlar, “Ortadoğu’da Banş Yamisaması.” Avrasya Dosyası. Cilt.5, Sayı. 1, (İlkbahar 
1999), ss. 102-110.
■*“ Melissa Morris, “Walking the line,” Harward International Review. Vol.20, Issue.2, (Spring 1998), 
p.l5.
Ibid, p.l5.
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opinion polls which were conducted for “the US Information Agency” in 1996, 47 
percent of the Turks see Turkey as part of the Muslim community, whereas 27 percent 
views it as belonging to Europe and 15 percent says that it is a part of “both”.
The Refah party experience also underscored a stark reality that the army, the guardian 
of Atatürk’s legacy, will hardly consent to the. elements that are incompatible with the 
foundations of the Turkish republic.'’“ Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the former 
Refah Party, was challenging these foundations by his official trips. The first was to 
Iran where he signed a $23 billion natural gas agreement,^'^ which was strongly 
criticized by the US government.^'^ Erbakan’s next trip was designed to Libya where 
he hoped to accomplish his aim of forming solidarity among the Muslim world while 
paying no heed to the warnings from the domestic political scene. He returned with 
nothing but a rude shock, resulting from Libya’s leader Kaddafi’s criticism of Turkey’s 
Kurdish policy and Turkey’s ties with the US, contemptuously.^^ Kaddafi’s statements 
that were beneath contempt, prompted a growing unease among the public and the
media. 56
Refah officials, in direct contravention of the estabhshed position of the Turkish state 
against the PKK and Syria, claimed that Turkey might follow a “more 
accommodating” policy over the water dispute with the Arab nei^^hbors.^’'
51 Sayan, p.55.
Christopher De Bellaigue, ‘Turkey: Into the Abyss?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 21, No.3, 
(Summer 1998), p.l37.
The New York Times. (13 August 1996).
The Washington Post. (13 August 1996).
The Washington Post. (8 October 1996).
Sedat Ergin, “Erbakan’m Türkiye Cumhuriyetine Ayıbı”, Hürriyet, (10 October 1996).!
Hürriyet. (9 August 1996).
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All of these developments were the indirect signs of the strategic partnership between 
Israel and Turkey. To be more specific, by and large, there exists various and essential 
constraints on any domestic party’s efforts to achieve their foreign policy objectives 
which comprise major shifts in Turkey’s relations with the Middle East. To begin with, 
the views of the military should be taken into account. The Turkish military itself is a 
military embedded with cardinal realignments in Turkey’s foreign and defense pohcies. 
Specifically, it is committed to Turkey’s membership in NATO. There are regional 
constraints as well, such as, long-lasting negative historical legacies of the Turco-Arab 
relations, the ill-fated idea of having solidarity and cooperation among Muslim 
countries in the Middle East. Arab regimes concerns of any possible tie of militant 
Islamic groups in their countries with the groups in Turkey’s political sphere are other 
sources of the conflict. In effect, this was the case for the Refah party; it was believed 
that the party had close relations with the militant Islamic groups, for instance, Hamas, 
Egypt’s MusUm brotherhood and representatives of other groups were present at the 
party’s annual congress held in Ankara in August 1996.^®
58 Yeni Yu2yil, (14 October 1996).
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH-ISRAELI
RELATIONS
2.1. Turkey and the Middle East
To some scholars, Turkey is a torn country because its “state elites” try to fulfill a 
variety of rules to gain a Western country status while its cultures and traditions are 
non-western.^^ Whereas some others believe that Turkey is a bridge that links NATO 
to the Middle East and the Southwest Asia.
In effect, Turkey, in the post cold war security environment felt that it was provided 
with the role of being a regional power in the central Asia, Caucasus and the Persian 
Gulf.
In regard to the Middle East, Turkey pays heed to the political activities due to some 
reasons: such as, 1) Historical legacy, 2) “Kurdish Problem”, 3) Security concerns of 
access to oil, 4) Water politics, 5) Palestinian Question and 6) Islam. The amalgam of 
these factors contributed greatly to Turkey’s position in the region.®*’
Samuel Huntington, ‘T he Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs (72), No. 3, (1953) p.42. 
Müftüler, p.l 19.
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To be more open, a blueprint of Turkey’s relations with the region thi'oughout the 
history is often perceived something hard to produce. The effort to list the general 
characteristics for the conduct of the relations can hardly be wholly successftil. To 
begin with, from 16'*' century to the Arab revolution during the World War I, the 
Ottomans ruled most of the region Turkish republic developed a formal complex, and 
sometimes differentiated relation pattern with the Middle Eastern states.^' After the 
Turkish republic established, Turkey had rather a limited involvement in the region, 
except from the Baghdad Pact in the mid 1950’s.
Turkey developed rather loose connections with the regional states until 1964. This 
was the year of the Cyprus Crisis. The crisis made Turkish officials feel the importance 
of the possible support that the region’s states might have given. Starting with the 
mid-1960s, Turkey’s foreign poHcy orientations included new directions. Soviet Union 
and the Middle Eastern countries were remembered again and Turkey sought to tackle 
the obstacles on its way to develop relations with these countries. In the 1970s Turkey 
deemed it absolutely necessary to reestablish the relations with the said countries; 
particularly because the oü crises and the 1974 US embargo (which continued to affect 
Turkey until 1979.)^" exacerbated the difficulties that Turkey was faced with. In the 
1980s these new orientations gained new momentum. The main reasons for that were 
the need for capital flow and the legitimacy seeking policies of the generals of the 
1980 coup d état. As regards Turkey s approach to the Arab-Israeli relations, it was 
not stable in the sense that it changed over the years with respect to the special 
conditions. As an example; although Turkey voted against the partition of Palestine in
Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East. London;· Printer, 1991, p.l7. 
Yavuz, p. 75.
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November 1947, it became the first among the Muslim countries in recognizing Israel, 
which in turn produced a backlash from the Arab countries.
The PLO was recognized as the representative of the rights of the Palestinian people in 
1976 and allowed to form a diplomatic mission in Ankara in 1979.^^ The peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel in 1979 was welcomed by Turkey, expecting that this treaty 
would ease the troubled situation within the Islamic world, thus giving the opportunity 
to carry on its relations with Israel.®“*
The peace process of the 1990s is seen as a key element in that, if it ends up 
successfully, friendship and sohdarity are expected to flourish among the region’s 
countries, which could, in turn, contribute to Turkey’s efforts to “reside in the region 
in peace and attain more fruitful cooperation with her neighbors in the area.®®
Concerning the water issue, Turkey has tried to approach the issue by peaceful, 
diplomatic activities, which illustrate Turkey’s goodwill. The problem, particularly 
sternming from the waters of Euphrates and Tigris rivers, emerged as a source of 
regional conflict.®®
To scholars, the riparians’ development projects are the main source of the problem 
that began in the early 1970s. Turkey’s approach towards the issue is the one, which 
favors the use of water courses of the basin in terms of “optimum, equitable and
“  Yavuz, p. 71.
ismail Soysal, “The Middle East Peace Process and Turkey,” The Turkish Review of Middle East 
Studies. Annual 94-95, p.70.
Ibid, p.74.
Turkey being the upstream, Syria the mid stream of Tigris and Iraq the downstream riparian 
countries.
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reasonable utilization” as an alternative to Iraqi-Syrian argument of sharing the water
in a simple mathematical manner. 67
The said plan is seen as a unique initiative in the literature as it is not only helpful for
gathering data and information about the land and water resources but a step in the
68regime formation as well.
Another project of the 1990s is the peace-pipeline project which aims to supply the 
Arab peninsula with water from Turkey’s two rivers, namely the Ceyhan and Seyhan 
rivers. It would export nearly 6 milhon m  ^ (cubic meters) a day to the Middle East. 
Turkey ascribes to the project the aim of making the Middle-Eastern countries 
dependent on itself for water and gain an upper hand as being a considerable regional 
power.
2.2. Turkish-Israeli Relations in Focus
The relatively new shape of the relations between Turkey and Israel necessitates to 
redo some of its relations with other countries. But to examine the relations between 
Israel and Turkey, one should firstly, dwell on the foreign pohcy conduct of the 
Turkish Republic. Various factors lead Turkey to pursue a “rationalistic” path in its 
foreign policy making. It is a secular country and hence religious considerations are 
not very much on the agenda. Its national interests are strived to be realized in its 
troubled location;
Ayşegül Kibaroğlu, “Prospects for Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin.” Turkish 
Review of Middle East Studies. Annual 1994/95, No:8, p. 140.
Ibid, p.l41
25
“Turkey is encii'cled in a geographical location by the Balkans, the Caucasus and the 
Middle East and hence open to infra and inter state conflicts in these regions.”^^  The 
founder of the republic, Atatürk, “provided a secular and dynamic framework for 
Turkish foreign pohcy makers.”™
In regard to international factors that contributed to Turkey’s conduct of its relations 
with Israel; Turkey’s Israeh policy was affected by external factors such as security 
concerns during the years 1946-1964; the Cyprus Question after 1964 and the 
economic constraints stemming from the oil crisis between the years 1977-1983.''*
Internal factors in the conduct of Israeli policies have rather hmited roles.™ From 1945 
to 1964, Turkey formulated its main policy objectives according to the Soviet threat. 
To gain more recognition and respect from the Western world, it tried to improve its 
relations with the Western World. In that period, Turkish politics towards the Middle 
East was, to a large extent, a function of its relations with the West.
After 1964, with the rise of the Cyprus crisis, following the US letter of June 5, 1964, 
Western countries did not support Turkey’s stand-points in different platforms. In 
effect, they left Turkey isolated at the UN on this issue, which, in turn, forced Ankara 
to seek new alternatives.
Mustafa Kibaroğlu. “Turkey”, in Europe and Nuclear Disarmament: Debates and Political 
Attitudes in 16 European Countries, edited by Harald Müller, Frankfurt PRIF, European University 
Press, 1998, p. 184.
™ Yavuz, p.42.
”  İhsan Gürkan, “Turkish Israeli Relations and the Middle East Peace Process Foreign Policy 
(Ankara). 1993, p. 113.
Concerning the internal factors, it can be said that although internal factors have an influence upon 
the conduct of the Israeli relations; such as the religious attitudes of political parties, it has a rather 
limited role, Islamic reactions are seen as the means along with other domestic factors.
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The oil crisis in 1973 also facilitated the multi-dimensional foreign policy orientations 
as a result of which, for example, Turkey increased its economic ties with the Arab 
countries and tried to play a more active role in the organization of the Islamic 
Conference. All of these prompted a critical stand towards Israel.
After the Israeli parliament Knesset declared Jerusalem as “united” and a “permanent 
capital” of Israel on July 30, 1980, Turkey responded with the closure of the Turkish 
consulate on August 28, 1980 and formaUy downgrading the relations on December 2, 
1980. Although these decisions seemed to be taken with an Islamic tone, they were 
rather out of economic necessity especially in the years 1978-1981, the economy 
needed foreign currency and oil. The depletion of hard currency; dechne in the amount 
of remittances from Turkish workers abroad; the US embargo and the absence of the 
economic aid until 1979, aU exacerbated the economic hardship, Turkey faced with. In 
eai'ly 1980’s Turkey downgraded its relations'with Israel. The mihtary regime did so 
formally on 2 December 1980, which to a large extent was viewed much as an attempt 
to have internal and external Islamic credibility. This decision did not intend to break 
off the relations with Israel, by downgrading the relations, Turkey was acting, hence, 
not in direct contravention of the US and European positions on Israel. In so doing, 
Turkey was thinking of the military and financial aid from the US and also wanted to 
maintain its active positions in the European institutions.
After the Camp David Accords, the Arab pressure on Turkey’s relations with Israel 
began to decrease. In 1986, there emerged a new momentum in the relations; Mr. 
Ekrem Güvendiren, a senior diplomat was appointed to the head of legation in Tel-
Turkish Daily News. (7 September 1998). 
Yavuz, p.79.
27
Aviv; Israel, in turn, by sending Mr. Yehuda Milo to Ankara responded positively to 
this upgrading attempt. Also, in 1988, at the UN, Turkey voted against an Arab 
resolution, which called for the rejection of Israeli diplomatic credentials. Moreover, 
the trade volume has jumped from $ 29 million in 1986, to $ 140 million in 1990.^^
75 Ibid.
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CHAPTER III
THE IMPETUS TO THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
There are some factors, which can be seen as the main motivations of the decision 
makers of Turkey and Israel in the formation of the strategic partnership in post-Cold 
War era.
3.1. Turkish Motivations
1) The Kurdish insurgency, after the Gulf-War exacerbated Turkey’s not only internal 
economic and social conditions but its relations with the other states. Turkey, to 
respond to the PKK’s brutal tactics, needed to employ the necessary combatting 
tools that comprised various social, political measures which attracted severe 
criticism, mainly from the Western world. As an example, in 1995, Germany, 
Norway and Belgium decided to halt the arms sales to Turkey as- a result of their 
public pressure, that stemmed from the PKK's sympathizers' activities and appeals 
to the public in the European countries for support. Regarding the US reaction, 
Washington, particularly after the 1980 military takeover in Turkey, has almost 
always sided with Turkey and helped Turkey to gain necessary weapons and 
military assistance. Turkey was America’s most favored arms client just behind 
Israel and Egypt. (The weaponry flow totaled $ 6 billion in the 1984-1993 time 
span.) By and large, this was a result of the strategy of protecting the US interests
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from the Soviet threat and Islamic militancy. Consequently, Turkey had a huge 
source of weaponry which were, to a great extent, subsidized by the US treasury or 
conveyed free of charge.’  ^These weapons .were essential in Turkey’s fight against 
the PKK.
However, from 1996 onwards, this flow has been cut down, resulting from the
(
lobbying activities of different ethnic and human rights groups, which included the 
State Department’s human rights bureau.’^
Turkey, in turn, felt increasingly in a state of unease and strived to develop its own 
arms industry which paved the way for better relations with Israel. Turkey had 
chosen Israel, since it needed a country which is a technologically advanced country 
in its sophisticated weapon production and more importantly, a country that can 
come to Turkey’s assistance without putting any reserve or attach human rights 
conditions to its weapons sales.
2) Another facilitating factor was the relations of Turkey and Israel with and within 
the Arab World. Turkey began to have a declining trend in trade relations with the 
Arab world in the 1990s. Turkey’s exports to Arab countries fell from 47 percent 
of its total exports in 1982 to 12 percent in 1994; politically, the Gulf War made it 
explicit that the fragmentation of the Arab world is very much on the agenda that 
forced the Turkish officials to believe that the notion of an “Arab bloc” is rather a
rhetoric. 78
John Tirman “Improving Turkey’s Bad Neighborhood: Pressing Ankara for Rights and 
Democracy,” World Policy Journal, Vol.l5, No. 1, p.62.
”  Ibid.
Gtirkan, p. 123.
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Additionally the peace agreements between the PLO and Israel in 1993 and Jordan 
and Israel in 1994, provided a solid ground that protected them from both Arab 
criticism and domestic reactions. In this regard, for instance, some argue that if 
there were no peace-process, the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel could 
hardly be imagined.^^ Also, the ministry of foreign affairs, made a statement which 
aimed at responding to domestic opposition to normalizing relations with Israel, the 
statement read that there was no reason to be more Arab than the Arabs, that is, it 
would be meaningless to act reluctantly to seek to develop the relations with
Israel. 80
3) Turkey’s ruling elite might also think that it could get Washington’s support via 
Israel’s “good offices.” Israeli support through then- lobbying activities could also 
help to circumvent the US and European arms embargoes which, Turkey believes, 
come along as a result of anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies’ efforts. To be more specific, it 
is stressed that one of the main lucrative outcome of the strategic partnership is that 
its connection with Israel enables Turkey to bypass US and European arms 
embargoes. The human rights criticism of the US and the Europe served as a main 
impediment to the access to weapons it needed. In recent years, the groups such as, 
“Amnesty International U.S.A.” carried campaigns to block any American sale, 
because of the possibility of using those weapons in Turkey’s fight against the 
“Kurdish civilians”. Also, in December 1997, prime minister Yılmaz met with 
Clinton and faced with Clinton administrations refusal on the sales of the weapons. 
President Clinton also made it clear that:
Interview with Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, in Milliyet, (21 July 1997). 
Yavuz, p.27.
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“no final US export licence would be approved unless Turkey could demonstrate 
improvements in human rights.”*' Another example was the blocking of two Cobra 
hehcopters and frigates’ sales in 1996. All of these forced Turkey to be open to the 
alternatives.
4) The rapprochement, also, enabled some Turkish interests to be on the agendas of 
groups like the “Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA),” (a 
Washington based think tank) and the American Israel Public Action (AIPAC) (an 
influential pro-Israeli group). For instance, JINSA has sided with Turkey and 
spoken out against foreign aid cuts toward Turkey and also served as a mediator 
between US military figures and their Turkish counterparts.
Additionally, the American-Turkish Association of Ankara, requested for a possible 
help from a number of Jewish Groups like American Jewish Congress, B’nai Brith 
and AIPAC. Israel, in turn, responds to the requests of Turkey, Israeli defense 
minister Yitzhak Modechai has confirmed these activities and said; “Israel is 
assisting Turkey on the American political scene and encouraging Jewish 
organizations to follow this example.”®* The efforts of these groups can help 
Turkey to offset the harmful activities of Greek and Armenian lobbying groups.
5) Although Israel denies that it has helped to make Syria bow to Turkey’s certain 
interests*“* it is believed, that Ankara through its security cooperation may have
83
84
Jennifer Washburn,“Power Bloc,” The Progressive, 20 (1), December 1998, p.3.
Ibid., p.6.
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Uri Gordon, (Ambassador), “Israeli-Turkish Relations,” Bilkent University Seminar Series, 16
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wanted to send a signal to Damascus by giving the impression that it is 
surrounded.*^
6) Turkey needed to give a response to Greece’s policy of encircling it by military 
agreements with Syria in July 1995.
7) Another source of concern that might have led Turkey to tend toward Israel is its 
fear about the potential for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in its 
neighborhood, namely in Iraq and Iran. Turkey, in this regard, reckons on the 
opportunity to collaborate with the Israehs on deterrents such as theater missile 
defense. (Turkey does not “perceive” any threat from Israel’s nuclear arsenal.)*®
8) Some argue that Turkey’s policy toward Israel is also designated as an attempt to 
impede the “Kurdish State” project of both Israel and some Jewish lobbies in the
87
US which use Washington’s influence and power.
9) Turkey’s military, whose influences on foreign policy decisions are increasingly
felt, is believed to have an upper hand in improving the relations with Israel. It is
stressed that the aim was also to send a message to the pro-Islamic government
(Refah) by exposing its powerlessness to prevent the strategic partnership, before it 
88had openly opposed. *
Interview with Retired Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ, 15 Febmaıy 1999, Ankara.
Vural Altay, (speaker from the Turkish foreign ministry) “A Two Day Conference on Proliferation 
of Weapons of Moss Destruction And Its Implications For Regional And Global Security And 
Stability,” 04-05 Feb. 1999 Bilkent University, Ankara.
Ümit Özdağ, “İsrail’in Kuzey Irak Politikası,” Avrasya Dosyası. Cilt 5, Sayı.l, (ilkbahar 1999),
S.231.
** Interview with Prof. Meliha Altumşık (Department o f International Relations, Middle Eastern 
Technical University), 10 May 1999, METU, Ankara.
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1) Establishing warming relations with Arab and Muslim nations, as a part of the 
vision of a “New Middle East”, (by former Israeli foreign and prime minister 
Shimon Peres), has been a general framework of the relations of the Israeli state 
with the regional states. In this regard, it is stressed that Turkey might serve as a 
bridge to other Muslim countries. Although with the Netanyahu administration the 
nature of the relations with the Arab world has been deteriorated, the emphasis 
upon Turkey’s role in the peace-process has always been put.
2) With the frustration that the Israeli government might have had with the peace talks 
with Syria by 1996, it could think that Turkey may serve to exert pressure on 
Syria, in that regard.*^
3) Israel believes that it has a more lasting commonality with Turkey on anti-terrorism 
and in military and civilian trade than other countries. The former IsraeU prime 
minister Netanyahu, echoed Turkey’s criticism of Syrian support for terrorism, 
including both HizbuUah and the PKK in May 1997.
4) Israel is concerned about Iran’s potential to produce weapons of mass destruction, 
in addition to the attempts of Iraqi government. Many people believe that the 
Turkish connection enabled Israel to gather intelligence on Iraq, Iran and Syria
3.2. Israeli M otivations
■ r  d n said that Israeli officials think that they [Israelis] should speak Turkish when they have 
^^with^S^ia (indicating Turkey’s success to force Syrian authority to send Abdullah Ocalan,
the head of the PKK, packing).
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through the opportunity of flying in the Turkish airspace that was provided by the 
security cooperation between Israel and Turkey in 1996.
5) Despite the fact that IsraeU-Turkish security cooperation does not foresee any 
partners’ commitment to come to the defense of the other in case of a war, it leads 
Israel to augment its strategic superiority in the region.^”
6) It is also stressed that Israel would be in a position to benefit from Syria’s, Iran’s, 
Iraq’s and others’ “having to consider” the possibility of Turkey’s help with 
respect to the necessary intelligence and other “non-combat assistance” in case of a 
confrontation. It is seen as a “psychological connection” that scared the
neighbors.91
7) Bearing in mind the fact that for the next twenty-five years, Turkey plans to spend a 
$ 150 biUion to modernize its militai’y, it can be said that Israel’s defense industry 
has been boosted by the contracts for military sales and modernization projects of 
Turkish state. It is emphasized that the “bad shape” of Israeh Aircraft Industry is 
now changing and shaped up by the help of Turkish F-4 and F-5 contracts and 
other Turkish deals.
8) A réévaluation of Israeli foreign-policy strategy in the 1990s may explain the 
framework of relations with Turkey, which has been described as follows;
♦ Solving the border conflicts and forming a security belt within the peace process.
Turkish Daily News, (26 August 1998). 
Christian Science Monitor. (27 February 1998).
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♦ Concluding the process of integration and recognition as a legitimate and equal 
state in its region in this security belt,
♦ Gaining diplomatic flexibility in manipulating the interstate conflicts of the 
Middle Eastern countries,
♦ Exploiting the resources of the region and introducing multi-country projects 
with the support of international Jewish communities,
♦ Opening up Asia and then developing its diplomatic and economic relations with 
more southern countries,
♦ Using the opportunities created by the complex web of relations to reach an 
influential position in the formation of global strategies and to escape from the 
confines of the Middle East to establish a greater global presence.’^
9) Another factor is related to the economic relations of both Turkey and Israel with 
the US and EU. Israel’s declining trend in trade relations with the US and EU, in 
addition to the GAP project of Turkey, which could serve as a neai'by-field, for 
feeding Israeli people and as a huge market for Israeli high-technology products; 
based on farming, all, might have led Israel to tend toward Turkey.
10) Israel’s new initiatives, that gained momentum with the end of the Cold Wai', in 
the Central Asian republics, can be seen as another factor in the developing 
relations of Turkey and Israel. Israel strives to have a firm hand in Central Asia 
through the good offices of Turkey. Considering the Arab states and particularly 
Iran’s role in the said region, it can be said that they try to create a sphere of
Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Yahudi Meselesinin Tarihi Dönüşümü ve İsrail’in Yeni Stratejisi, “Avrasya 
Dosyası. Cilt 1, Sayı.3, (Sonbahar 1994) ss. 66-67.
Osman M. Öztürk, ‘Türkiye-İsrail Askeri İşbirliği Üzerine, “Avrasya Dosvası. Cilt 5, Sayı.l, 
(İlkbahar 1999) s.252.
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influence by providing the regions’ states with financial aid and investment in 
certain areas, leave aside their “cultural” activities. However, when comparing 
those activities with Israeli ones, which comprised the attempts to improve the 
telecommunication sectors of the Central Asian states, it can be seen that Israel is 
in a unique position with its necessary expertise that can weU upset the others’ 
apple cart. In this stage, Israel, in addition to use the Washington’s support, wants 
to have Turkey’s help, since it could both “neutralize” some problems of 
penetration into the markets of the former Soviet republics and serve as an ally in 
Israel’s struggle against Iran. '^*
The strategic importance of Central Asia for Israel can hai'dly be confined to the 
economic gains. The existence of nuclear expertise and technology in the region also 
forces Israel to be mindful of the need for discretionary measures. To be more specific; 
M oscow’s declaration to seU two peaceful nuclear reactors to Iran is an uncomfortable 
reminder of what sort of threat Israel may face, particularly, from the possibility of the 
transfer of the nuclear expertise or technology from the central Asian states, to Iran 
and other states.
94 Bülent Aras, “Post-Cold War Realities,” Middle East Policy. Vol.5, No.4 (Jan, 1998) p.71.
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CHAPTER IV
TURKISH ISRAELI RELATIONS IN THE 1990s
4.1. The Changing Nature of Bilateral Relations
Turkey’s lingering policy of balance between the Arab countries and the Israeli state 
began to alter after the Gulf War.
To begin with, the relatively new rapprochement between Turkey and Israel can be 
said to have started by the visit of the Turkish tourism minister Abdülkadir Ateş m 
June 1992 to Israel, which was to be the first by a Turkish minister in twenty-seven 
years; whose fruits included the signing of a treaty facilitating tourism between the two 
coun t r i e s . As  of 13 September 1993, the first signs of the drastic shift in the relations 
began to appear. This was the date of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles. On 14 
October 1993 came the visit of then Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Çetin. It is 
marked as the first highest ranking Turkish officials’ visit since the creation of the 
Israeh state in 1948. On the agenda were mainly, the economic issues ranging from the 
Israeli desire to penetrate deep into central Asia via Turkey to Turkey’s request of 
Israeli support in obtaining US basking for the oil pipelines’ routes from the Caspian 
Sea to its port of İskenderun. The visit’s outcome was the signatures on the
See M. Hakan Yavuz, Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.27, N o.l (Autumn 1997), pp.22-38.
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documents which were designed to be the framework agreements on economic 
cooperation, tourism and educational exchange programs.
The first official declaration of the newly emerging rapprochement came from Çetin 
that was presented as a “New-Era in Turco-Israeli relations,” which was reaffirmed by 
Çetin’s words “Turco-Israeh relations will develop in all fields, we have agreed that 
Turkey and Israel should co-operate in restructuring the Middle East” .^ ^
Israeli visits followed to underscore the strategic implications of Çetin’s visit. Israeli 
Defense Minister Director-General David Ivry headed a delegation of senior officials 
and generals to Ankara to examine the potential areas of cooperation. Then came the 
Israeli President Ezer Weizman’s visit on 25-27 January 1994. It was the first 
presidential visit between Turkey and Israel that marked an important step forward for 
regional developments, he met with Turkey’s political, economic and business leaders. 
In his meeting with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel said:
“We want the door to peace to be further opened. Our efforts are aiming at creating a 
Middle East where people spend their energy and money on development rather than 
on arms. It makes us excited to see that or hopes can come true.”^^
After these talks president Weizman underlined Turkey’s significance and importance 
for regional stability. He said:
Ibid.
Ibid.
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“Turkey, one of the regional powers in the Middle East, can be very effective in the 
peace process. I think that the Turkish authorities are interested in the development of 
the Middle East. Turkey is of prime importance because it is an Islamic country which 
is both secular and democratic and has a dialogue with all countries in the region.
Ezer Weizman’s visit was followed by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’s official visit 
on 11 Aprü 1994 to Ankara where he met with the Turkish foreign minister. The 
outcome was an agreement on the environment, there was also discussions of 
opportunities to further the newly established bilateral relations with Çetin. Political, 
economic and cultural ties were included. According to Çetin, the crux of the 
discussions were related to “mutually profitable trade and economic relations and the 
opening of Israel to the Turkish-speaking countries of the former USSR.” He also laid 
a stress on Turkey’s unique position as a “Jink between the Western and Islamic 
worlds.” Another aspect of the discussions was about the Israeli deshe for Turkey to 
adopt a “more active role” in the Middle East peace-process. Israeli foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres tried to encourage Turkey to take the initiative in the formation of a 
“Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East a regional organization
similar to the European one. 99
The next visit was from Turkish prime minister Tansu filler to Israel on 3-4 
November 1994 which also marked a new phase in Turkish-Israeli relations, (filler, 
during the visit, pressed for a free-trade agreement (which would be signed on 14 
March 1996 and ratified in April 1997) although it was unsuccessful in that respect, 
she concluded a cooperation agreement in various fields, ranging from
Presidents and Prime Ministers. Vol.3, issue 4, July/August 1994, p.36 
”  Presidents and Prime Ministers. Vol.3, issue.5, September/October 1994, p.34
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telecommunications, postal services to combating drug trafficking. In fact, the 
importance of the visit lay in elsewhere, namely, in the political sphere; Israeh prime 
minister Yitzhak Rabin thanked Çiller “of taking a step no other Turkish prime 
Ministers ever dared to make; to visit Israel.”‘°° In addition to that. Çiller praised 
Zionism and compared Ben-Gurion with A t a t ü r k . The Israeli side read the visit as a 
symbolic action that marked a major political change in the region.
On June 3, 1994 Israeli economics and planning minister Shimas Shetreet signed an 
agreement in his visit to Turkey, that brings private and public organizations together 
to promote trade between the two countries to make efforts to get Israeli, Palestinian, 
and Turkish organizations together by using Turkish funds.
On 23 February 1996 a Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation and Training agreement 
has been signed which was learned in April 1996.'°”* Despite the contents of the 
agreement have not been officially released, the press reported that it was about a joint 
training agreement with the Israeli air force and navy.'°^ Also, according to the 
reports, there will be exchanges of military personnel and visiting rights at each other 
bases and Israel will be allowed to conduct electronic surveillance flights along 
Turkey’s borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria.
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Meanwhile, Erbakan wanted to change the course of the “alliance” he, later, has even
vowed to “annul Turkey’s pact with Israel and withdraw from NATO. 107
The new agreement was a turning point in that, a de-facto military agreement was 
coming to life which indicated a significant strategic realignment in the Middle East,'*^* 
and although Turkish officials strived to play down the significance of it by claiming 
that it was “routine”, Israeli side admitted that the relationship has a strategic
significance 109
The Arab world and Iran, see it as a threat: “It is dangerous because the Jews want to 
extend thek reach to other Muslim nations like Iraq, Iran and Syria,” says Moustafa 
Mashour, the head of the Islamic fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo.
The leaders of Syria, Iraq and Iran were critical that its principal aim is to check their 
influence m the region, for instance, Al-Baath, the organ of Syria’s ruhng party views 
the agreement with Israel as a major escalation of Turkey’s “anti-Arab” policy, saying 
that “Turkey has no right to imperil the security and stability of the region in order to 
appease word Zionism and NATO."*” A commentator; Salaheddin Hafez of Egypt a 
writer in the Saudi owned Al-Hayat of London characterizes the agreement as part of 
Israel’s plans for a new Middle-Eastern order and says: “This would reduce and 
perhaps cancel out entirely the roles of Egypt and Syria.”**^
Christian Science Monitor. (29 July 1996).
Christian Science Monitor. (29 August 1996).
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The official Syrian Newspaper Tishreen writes: “no matter how hard the Turkish 
government tries to cover up and market this agreement, it poses a threat to the 
security of Syria and all Islamic countries,”“ ^
The agreement came at a time when Syria was in need of friends, especially 
considering the further isolation by Washington for “snubbing” secretary of State 
Warren Christopher in early 1996. It was in this framework that President Assad met 
with Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian authority in Damascus and reportedly, 
he also met with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in secret neai' the border with Iraq .''“*
Iran has also began to make overtures to Syria by having a coUegial high level meeting 
between Syrian and Iranian leaders in Teheran .in August 1996.
Back to the relations of Turkey and Israel, the following cooperation was in the field 
of military. A $ 59 m illion  deal of modernization of Turkey’s fleet of F-4 Phantom 
fighters with high-tech equipment was concluded. The task was given to the Israeli 
Aircraft Industries (lAI). A Turkish General Çevik Bh viewed this as representing the 
fii'st step towaid military cooperation. According to the reports. Prime Minister 
Erbakan signed the deal under “pressure” from the Turkish military on 8 December 
1996.“ ·'
Turkey also purchased fifty ’’Popeye I” missiles, also, the two sides agreed to invest $ 
150 millions in the production of “Popeye II air-to-ground” missiles jointly by a 
consortium to be established by two Turkish firms and Rafael.“ *^
Christian Science Monitor, (29 August 1996). 
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The free-trade pact signed in March 1996 has the aim of a fourfold increase in annual 
trade between the two countries in three years, that is from $ 450 millions to $ 2 
Bülions at the end of 1999. The agreement became effective in May 1997. Turkey 
expects to benefit from the accord through Israel’s free-trade agreement with the US 
(in 1986) which enables it to have ties with Canada and Mexico as well. In addition 
trade barriers and tariff are to be lifted gradually except agricultural products.**^ David 
Levy, Israeli Foreign Minister in his two-day visit to Turkey in April 1997 planned to 
push for the implementation of the free-trade agreement.*^*
The joint projects can hai'dly be confined to these above areas the two countries are 
also working on different sectors such as, electricity production, commercial satellites 
and cargo transport. Israeli tourists often visit Turkey. In 1996 the number was nearly 
300.000, the money the spent was about $ 3 billions. By the year 2000, this number of 
tourists is expected to reach 350.000. Turkish airlines is the second lai'gest carrier in 
and out of Tel-Aviv, following Israel’s El-Al.“ ^
There were also the reports of the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles for 
reconnaissance, attack and communications. Turkey declared its plan to purchase 
airborne early warning and control aircraft in addition to the “falcon early warning 
aircraft systems which is plastic and conventional radar system for detecting the mines 
and radars. The candidates of the deal included; Boeing’s E-3 AW ACS, the Nuthop
The New York Times. (20 July 1997).
Journal of Commerce, (4 November 1997).
Daniel Prpes, “A Nex Axis: The Energing Turkish-Israeli Entente,” The National Interest. 
(Winter 97-98), p.35.
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Grummon E-2C Hawkeye, an airborne early warning version of Lockheed Martin’s C- 
130’s and Israeli Air-Craft Industry’s Phalcon.*^^ Israel is also planning to supply 
Turkey with 1000 “Merkava Mark I l l’s which are main battle tanks, at a cost of $ 5
bilhons. 122
As a part of the February 1996 agreement, the pilots spend their times in each others’ 
countries, eight times a year. The training aspect of the agreement is also important. 
Turkey stands to benefit from the opportunities of learning about the electronic 
warfare in Israel. What Israelis get from is that they could have the access to the 
AnatoUan plateaus which provide them with having practice of long-range flying over 
a mountainous land that alters from flying over waters, (that can serve as a necessary 
practice for “possible missions” against Iran and for gathering valuable information
1^3about Iraq and Syria). '
Considering joint naval and air maneuvers m the Mediterranean Sea in June 1997, 
which aim at coordinating “search-and-rescue” activities in the international waters 
close to Syria cost. Earlier, the two countries declared that it would be a three-way 
and five day naval exercises including the US, called “Operation Reliant Mermaid I” 
and scheduled to be held in mid-November 1997. But because it stirred up discontent 
among to region’s states, they were postponed twice.
Paul Proctor, ‘Turkey wants AEW”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 146, issue. 12 
(March 1997) p.l3.
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The most significant element of the developing relations between the two countries in 
the 1990’s has been in the military field. The famous landmark agreement was on the 
military cooperation in April 1996. Through the means of February 1996 agreement, 
the cooperation included; military training exercises, exchange of military observes at 
each others’ exercises, reciprocal port access for naval vessels, reciprocal training of 
unarmed military aircraft in each other’s air spaces.
Regarding the military industry cooperation, arms sales, the ongoing modernization of 
Turkish F-4’s and F-5’s with Israeli know-how, joint-production of Israeli “Popeye-I 
and Popeye-H” air- to ground missiles, the purchase of F-16 fuel tanks from Israel, the 
Israeli proposal to upgrade Turkish M-69 tanks in addition to the proposal to sell 
“Merkava” tanks to Turkey, the sale of Turkish-built armored cars to Israel and also 
the agreement on building long range Arrow anti-craft missiles were all made possible 
in the context of the developing relations in the 1990’s.‘‘‘‘
Considering the civilian agreements; the “Free Trade Agreement’’ in 1996, (which is 
seen as the main component of the commercial relations.) “Customs Agreement” m 
December 1996 and the “Trade Agreement” in June 1996, all of these contributed a 
lot to the developing relations, for instance the ‘Trade Agreement” (on 16 June 1996) 
provided the followings:
4.2. An Overview of the Relations in the 1990’s
124 The Turkish Probe. (30 August 1998).
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1) Each will lower the customs and import taxes for materials and products to be 
exhibited,
2) Each will facilitate the passage of others trade with the third countries (in this 
context, Turkey is believed to be capable of reaching to the US market),
3) Each will cooperate in technical and scientific fields to encourage economic 
development,
4) Each win cooperate comprehensively in exchanging research data,
5) Both will exchange scientific specialists technicians,
6) Both win share information regarding scientific and technical research in the 
industrial and agricultural sectors.
Other aspects of the civilian relations are multifarious; to state some of them; an 
agricultural protocol was provided for Israel in order to train Turkish technicians from 
Turkey’s huge “Southeast Anatolian Project” (GAP) and to establish a “demonstration 
farm” in the region, for Israel. The cooperation in the health sector can also be 
mentioned, in addition to the educational exchanges, which is an ongoing process.*“^
Israel is also trying to make of the access to oil and gas from Turkey. In case Turkey’s 
aim to become a major pipeline route for energy resources from the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, comes along; Israel could make use of it by undergoing many joint- 
projects with Turkey.
4.3. The Impact of Turkish-Israeli Relations on Turkish-Syrian Relations
125 Israil’den Haberler. Issue. 17. (March-July 1998), pp.15-16.
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S3a‘ian support for the PKK historic hostility stemming from the status of Hatay the 
former Sanjak of Alexandretta, annexed by Turkey in 1939 following a referendum; 
Turkey’s GAP project with its dams on the Euphrates are the sources of the ill nature 
of the relations between Syria and Turkey. Turkey’s pohcy of “hot-pursuit” deep into 
Iraqi soils also makes Syria anxious, and lead their leaders believe that Ankara still 
holds the “ambitions to control the oil-rich Iraqi provinces of Mosul and Kerkuk.” '^^
With regard to one of the most problematic aspect of the relations that is the Syrian 
support for the PKK, Turkey waited until 1995 to make this issue the main criterion of 
any bilateral relations, despite the clarity of Syrian backing of the PKK and its leader: 
Abdullah Ocalan. In early 1996, Turkey decided to suspend aU official contacts with 
Syria after Damascus refused to extradite the head of the PKK, albeit Turkey’s official
request. 127
Considering the Syrian situation, although the officials of both Turkey and Israel 
generally and commonly state that their relations are not directed to any third paity, 
Syria is likely to be affected by the rapprochement. Some Israeh officials underline this 
nature of the relations as well; for instance:
“Although Turkey has never taken a part in a war alongside us, it is a positive factor 
for Israel that Syria has an enemy on its northern frontiers. Syria will never attack 
Turkey, but it cannot exclude the reverse. Turkey has a long experience of fighting
Greish, p .l95.
Milliyet, (19 February 1996).
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outside its borders in particular, in the north of Iraq”, says Uri Or, a reserve general 
and former joint minister of defense in the Peres government.
Particularly after Likud Party came to power in Israel, the anti-Syrian aspect of the 
Israeli-Turkish rapprochement became apparent. On April 30, 1997, Turhan Tayan, 
then Turkish defense minister paid an official visit to Israel, where he, also, visited the
1^9Israeli occupied Golan Heights. ‘
Netanyahu’s condemnations of the PKK for the first time came a few days after 
Tayan’s trip to Golan. This was hardly a coincidence. Netanyahu, rejecting the idea of 
a “Kurdish State” in his statement went further by saying:
"Turkey has suffered from terrorist attacks from the PKK and we see no difference 
between the terrorism of the PKK and one Israel suffers.
The departure of Abdullah Ocalan from Syria, after Turkey’s threats, in October 1998, 
is believed to be a decision taken by Syrian officials as a result of the security 
cooperation between Turkey and Israel.
By the strategic partnership of Turkey and Israel, Syria’s unsubstantiated agreement 
with Greece in July 1995, which opens Syrian air and naval bases to Greece, hence 
was balanced. Syrian, in turn, tried to rally the Arab world and Iran to its side.
In Greish, p.l92.
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After the efforts to mobilize Iraqi support, Syria also tended with Iran, its close aUy 
since 1979. Having common foes, namely Israel, they opposed the security 
cooperation between Israel (a “Zionist-entity” for them) and Turkey which is seen as a 
“challenging” NATO member on their borders. Some Arab nations are angered at the 
Turkish-IsraeU bloc with the fear of possible use of Turkish air space to “spy on” 
Syria, Iraq and Iran by Israel. In addition to these countries, some other Arab 
countries, to a large extent, view this bloc as a “betrayal” by Turkey.*^*
Syria and Iran, being the forerunners of this “opposing bloc” wanted to include other 
countries such as; Iraq, Greece, and Ai'menia as well.
To mention the name of some states, that have the “capability” to stay out of these 
blocs are Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Saudi A abia is said to have managed to stray from 
the blocs by enjoying strong ties with the US and Syria. Egypt represents a rather 
different case since it has the potential to side with the both blocs. It could join the 
Turkish-Israeli bloc, because it is a country that has developed close diplomatic ties 
with Israel since 1979. On the other hand, it could be caught of the balance by the 
drawbacks to the peace process its human-rights violations and nuclear proliferation 
which may result in its sliding with Syrian and Iranian bloc as well. Egypt is also 
mindful of the possibility that in case Turkish-IsraeU bloc develops, its importance and 
status in the region may wane. Back to the Syrian reaction, Syria sees itself as the 
“unstated target” of the Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership. Leading the opposition, it 
managed to issue a resolution calling on Turkey to reconsider its military accord with
Nadia El-Shazly, “Arab Argerat New Axis,” The World Today, (55), No. 1 (January 1999), pp. 25-
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Israel in June 1996 Arab summit Syrian foreign minister Fai'uq Al-Shara claimed that 
the agreement was a “very dangerous development.” Vice president Abd Al-Hniim 
Khaddam caUed it a “satanic alliance”. In 1998, Syria has softened its rhetoric and 
begun a process of dialogue with Turkey. Syrian and Turkish foreign ministers met on 
the OIC meeting, which did not issue a statement on Turkish-Israeh Cooperation for 
the first time since 1996.
Regarding the Iranian reaction, Iran hosted an “Organization of the Islamic 
Conference” summit in December 1997, where a resolution called for 
“reconsideration” of military cooperation with Israel.
Apparently, there seems to be not so much things that Syria and Iran shale or have in 
common. The national interests of both countries are forcing both countries to get 
together on certain issues. Although the mullahs of Iran question whether Hafez-Al- 
Assad is even a Muslim, the Iranian governments send both oil and tourists to Syria. 
Syria, in turn, gives a blank check to Iran to operate in Syidan-controUed Lebanon.
Turkish-Israeli relations are different while, generally, Iranian and Syrian relations lack 
“substantive” and operational links, Turkey and Israel are developing their relations 
almost in all fields. In regard to the non-military aspect of the partnership, Turkish- 
Israeh relations are superior in various terms. The fi-ee-trade zone and related 
institutions, such as, the Turkish-Israeli business council facilitate the trade between 
the two countries. Turkey became the firs destination for the Israeli tourists. Both 
countries are rid of double taxation; there are plans to export fresh water to Israel
133 Daniel Pipes, ‘The Real Middle East,” Commentary. Vol. 106, No.5, (November 1998), p.29.
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through huge bags; academic exchanges; special exhibits in the Museums; mutual visits
by religious leaders all of these became routine. 134
4.4. The Impact of Turkish-Israeli Relations on Other Countries in the Region
4.4.1. Egypt
Despite the fact, that Egypt, as the “leader of the Arab world” has been disapproving 
of the strategic partnership. Egyptian officials have seemingly been satisfied with 
Turkey’s explanations of ties with Israel in bilateral meetings with Turkish military and 
civilian leaders. Egypt tries for a balance in its relations with both Turkish-Israeli bloc 
and Arab bloc led by Syria and Iran. While playing down its strategic importance, 
Egypt appears to have sympathy to the concerns of Syria. Egyptian foreign minister 
Amr Musa said that the Turkish Israeli relations would have negative consequences on 
the strategic situation in the region.
4.4.2. Greece
Greece has taken a strong stand on the security cooperation and had a negative 
reaction to the developing relations. In February 1998, then foreign minister Pángalos, 
described it as “an alliance of wrongdoers that brings us to a cold-war situation.” He 
also emphasized upon the possibility that Israel would provide Turkey with 
intelligence and technology that could be turned against Greece then defense minister
134 Israil’den Haberler, Issue. 15, (May-June 1997), p.l6.
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Aids Tsohatzopolous characterized Israel’s choice of Turkey as “wrongheaded” and 
urged Israel to tend toward the European Union instead.
4.4.3. Greek Cyprus
Although Israel officially remains natural in regard to the dispute between Turkey and 
Greek Cyprus, it attracts, reactions from Greek Cypriot media. Israel, they report, may 
gather intelligence for Turkey on their new air base at Paphos and use its technology 
to jam their radar when a possible Turkish attack on Russian S-300 missiles occurs.
4.4.4. Jordan
Turkey and Israel are developing their relations with Jordan as well. Turkey and 
Jordan have had beneficial relations since 1920’s. Today both countries’ military pilots 
train both countries; the chiefs of staff meet regularly; the two government form high 
level formal groups to discuss the threats posed to the both countries. They, also, 
invited other neighbors to join a “Neighborhood forum” on these issues. The relations 
are perceived to be so important that Turkey’s ambassador to Amman says:
“Security cooperation [between Turkey and Jordan] has reached to the point where 
Turkish and Jordanian military forces are integrated into one.” *^  ^ The improving 
military and economic ties also had an impact on the relations with Jordan. The 
Jordanian and Turkish governments agreed to convene a meeting of the “Higher
Turkish-Jordanian Committee,” which has not met since 1992. 136
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Having signed the second peace agreement with Jordan, Israel has sought out a more 
comprehensive peace in the region.
With respect to the security cooperation between Israel and Turkey; Jordan strives to 
make a stand against the idea of its involvement into the “axis”. In a conference with 
then Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, the Jordanian Prime Minister said:
“the bilateral agreement between Turkey and Israel is something with which we do not 
interfere.” *^ ’ Rather the Crown Prince Hasan, the regent, called for a “comprehensive 
system” that includes all the countries in the region. He, also, described the notion that 
Jordan Turkey and Israel were entering into military alliance as “baseless.”*’*
4.4.5. Lebanon
Lebanon takes a tough stand on the Turkish-Israeh-“Jordanian” connection, the 
Lebanese foreign minister says:
“It is a pliers-like three way alliance to put the squeeze, [on my country and Syria.] „139
4.5. The US Reaction
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The US is welcoming the new partnership while not playing around with it. In effect, 
the US officially supports and even encourages it. Then the State Department 
Spokesman Nicholas Burns said:
“It makes sense to US that Israel and Turkey wants to be friends. If certain other Arab
countries don’t like that, that’s just tough.' ,140
The US also criticizes the Greek reaction to the rapprochement.*'*^ Some circles, 
however, held a different understanding in the way that the strategic partnership 
generates “potentially problematic realignments” in domestic American politics. For 
instance, as a “counter act” the Greek Americans have pulled away from the Jewish 
state after the Jewish lobbying groups began to side with Turkish interests. In addition, 
in April 1998, 81 senators signed a letter calling on the Clinton administration to stop 
“using public pressure against Israel” whereas a Greek American Paul Sarbones of 
Maryland, a long time supporter of Israeli state, strayed from joining them.“*"
It can be said that the US is also fearful of a possible reemergence of the “cold war 
logic” where it would tend toward one side and Russia toward the other. While 
already involved in various contentious issues, ranging from economic sanctions 
against Iraq to the shipment of the Russian arms to Greek Cyprus, the US does not 
deem it beneficial to act directly against Russia. The Arab states concern the US 
government as well. For instance, in regard to the Turkish-IsraeU-US maritime 
maneuvers or jomt-naval exercise called the “reliant mermaid,” the US raised the
Turkish Daily News. (11 May 1997).
The US ambassador to Greece, Nicholas Burns said that the Greed reaction to the rapprochement 
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question of timing (notwithstanding Israeli objection) and postponing the exercise to 
early 1998, because of the protests of the Arab world and its insistence on the 
presence of an Arab country as an observer. Washington achieved it objectives, that is, 
the postponement of the maneuvers and the presence of the commander of the 
Jordanian navy.*'*^
4.6. The Repercussions of the Rapprochemént
It is highly hkely that the strategic cooperation between Israel and Turkey is bound to 
have certain repercussions. To begin with, the diffusion of the strategic partnership 
into other fields may bring about various results that could have multifarious effects on 
Turkey’s and Israel’s relations with the “third-parties.”
For Turkey, some crises began to have a different face. The latest S-300 crisis is a 
clear sign for that. The Russian insistence to sell the missiles to Greek Cyprus in 
November 1998, forced Turkey to vow to prevent their deployment by any means 
necessary, since the missiles posed a threat to its soils as well.'“*“* Athens warned, in 
turn, that if Turkey attempts to destroy the missiles, it wül provide help to the Greek 
Cypriots in accordance with the mutual defense treaty between Greek Cyprus and 
Greece. So far, there may seem nothing related to the rapprochement between Israel 
and Turkey. The difference was in the “involvement” of the Israel into the crisis: 
according to the reports, Turkish foreign minister has asked the prime minister 
Netanyahu for a possible help to curb the transportation of the missiles. The arrest of
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the two members o f the Israeli secret intelligence service, namely; Mossad in Greek 
Cyprus for spying on a missile base revealed the “involvement” as well; the missile 
base was targeting weapons of Turkey.“*^ Also there were reports about the threat that 
the installation of Russian S-300 surface-to-air Missiles in Greek Cyprus may pose to 
the Israeh “freedom o f action” in the eastern Mediterranean. Hence, the result of the 
crisis was an overlap between the actions of Israel and Turkey. The US and Azerbaijan 
were also said to have Joined Turkey and Israel to prevent the transportation by 
providing Turkey with the necessary intelligence in regard to the possible routes of the 
missiles in their way to G reek Cyprus.
4.7. General Critics agaiast the Developing Relations
Turkey’s security cooperation with Israel marks important changes. The mihtary and 
economic ties are developing in a “healthy way .
However there are cena in  circles or groups, which direct critics at the strategic 
partnership that Turkev 2nd Israel have. There are also questions raised concerning the 
prospects for Arab-Israeii peace process; the stability of the Middle East and the future 
of the regional arms co o iro l efforts. As an example, some human-rights groups claim 
that the massive budd-ap  o f  Turkey’s military strength through the agreements with 
Israel, without being c-oodkioned by “human right concerns,” can be harmful for the
^  - 147
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The Sunday Times, f 15 1998) The arrest came along during a state visit to the Island
jjy in November 1998 where twenty other officers had participated on
intelligence operation on C y g n » -
Turkish Daily News. (-^ Sesfissisber 1998).
Tirman, p.60.
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Arms control advocates are concerned that Turkey’s acquisition of the Israeli weapons 
could undermine the arms race between Greece and Turkey through upsetting the 
military parity that the US tries a maintain, which would exacerbate resolution over 
their dispute over Cyprus, in addition to its harmful! effects on the international 
pressures over Turkey to democratize and employ a “political solution” to the 
“Kurdish problem”.*"^** Some states also fear that it could lead to a new arms race in 
the region.
It is also mentioned that the security cooperation could reduce Israel’s perceived need 
to try for a peace settlement and lead Syria less willingly involve itself into the peace 
process of force Syrian authorities to find out “alternative ways” to push the peace 
process back.
Another source of the concern is that. Turkish Israeli cooperation may lead other 
states in the region to form counter b l o c k s . T o  be more specific, there are signs of 
improvements in the relations between Iraq and Syria; for instance, in May and June 
1997 Syrian and Iraqi borders were opened for the first time in 16 yeai's; a trade 
delegation from Syria visited Baghdad; ministerial visits took place; oü pipelines fi'om 
Iraq to Syria were reopened in July 1998, all of these were giving the impression that a 
regional counter bloc may emerge.
There are also domestic criticism both in Turkey and Israel as regards the security 
cooperation. In Turkey, some circles are emphasizing the negative effects of appearing
Ibid.
Syrian leader Asad’s current overture to Russia to conclude a $2 billion arms deal, which 
overlapped Iraqi officials visit to Russia, on 5 July 1999 raised concerns in that respect 
http;//www.ntv.com.tr.
Interview with Şükrü Elekdağ, 15 Febniaiy 1999, Ankara.
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too pro-Israel, which could deteriorate the relations with the Arab world. Turkey’s 
Jewish community’s reaction vary from full support to cautios approaches. Those, 
who favor a cautious evaluation, stress the dangers of raising their profile through the 
relations. If, they fear, the drawbacks occur they wiU be in bad terms with the popular 
Islamist feelings in Turkey.
In Israel, there are alternative voices with regard to the strategic partnership as well. 
The skeptical voices in Israel, underscores that it will be a great mistake if the Israeli 
state supports the “anti-Kurdish” policies of T u r k e y . S o m e  also argue that it may 
reverse the process of Israeli struggle against the Pan-Arabian bloc within itself, to the 
old tactics of the “periphery strategy.”*^ '
Stuart Cohen, ‘Türkiye’yi Konuşma zamanı,“ Avrasya Dosyası. Cilt.5, Sayı 1, (İlkbahar-1999), 
s. 190.
The Jerusalem Post, (23 October 1998).
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CONCLUSION
The thesis tries to evaluate an understanding of the strategic partnership between 
Turkey and Israel that flourished in the 1990’s. It also depicts the process of the 
developing relations in the post cold war era.
From the early 1990’s, the relations between Israel and Turkey began to get a new 
shape; which reflected itself as a strategic partnership in the coming years. Turkey’s 
relatively low-profile approach to the Middle Eastern affairs shifted to have a more 
involved, risk-taking character. Turkey, also, began to act as the initiator in certain 
issues. Turkey’s alienation from Europe and the effects of the end of the Cold-War on 
its strategic importance in the calculations of the US; forced the political and military 
leadership to reexamine Turkey’s security and defense policies in its region. These 
changes resulted in Turkey’s siding with Israel.
Turkey and Israel have concluded various agreements in the 1990’s, most of which 
bore strategic importance. Amongst them, the “Military Cooperation and Training 
Agreement” that was signed on 23 February 1996 is seen as the bulwark of the 
strategic partnership. The new alignment comprised military cooperation, joint training 
exercises, intelligence sharing, economic and cultural ties.
Turkey’s push for such an alignment was related to several factors such as the need for 
support in its fight against Kurdish separatism that imposed certain direct or indiro',..
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negative results on its security (e.g. a de facto· embargo of US arms sale to Turkey. 
the supports of the Jewish lobbies in the US , taking counter-measures against Greek- 
Syrian alliance and the ruling elites’ desire to place an emphasis upon the unchangeable 
patterns of the state structure, such as; the secular chai'acter.
Israel, on the other hand, feeling relatively isolated on certain issues, tried to ally itself 
with Turkey, hoping to realize some of its security objectives with the help of Turkey. 
Turkey’s strong stand against Syria and its suitable position as regards the 
“reconnaissance missions” that are aimed at S}a‘ia, Iraq and Iran from Turkish air bases 
the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Syria, Iraq and Iran contributes a 
lot to the tension between Israel and the said countries in a way that Israel deems it 
beneficial to get Turkey’s support against them. Israel’s declining trend in trade 
relations with the US and EU; it’s efforts to have a sphere of influence in the Central 
Asia;‘^  ^ and the economic market feature of Turkey for Israel are other reasons for the 
fervent desire to side with Turkey.
The US supports this alignment on the ground that the two countries, along with 
Jordan and possibly Egypt, are the key actors in the region to help the US led 
“regional security regime” to come a l o n g . A l t h o u g h  the rapprochement attracted 
severe criticism from same Arab countries and even encouraged some (e.g. Iran Syria, 
Iraq and Greece) to form “counter alignments”, the extent and the depth of the 
strategic partnership that Turkey and Israel have, indicate that it will remain robust. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the strategic partnership between the two countries is
Gill Dibner, “My Enemy’s Enemy,” Harvard International Review, winter 1998-1999, p.35. 
Ibid, p.37.
Interview with Melina Altum§ik, 10 May 1999, Ankara.
Dibner, p.38.
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realized despite certain cultural and religious differences, it can be said that as long as 
regional conditions continue to reign that offer strategic benefits to the both countries, 
it will operate to maintain a soUd ground to be efficient and long-lasting.
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